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When data are sampled Dom a population and subjects revise proba- 
bility eshmates about which population is being sampled, their revisions 
are less than the optimal amount calculated by using Bayes's theorem; they 
are conservative. The experiments reported here used binomial populations 
with proportions that were either defined precisely by a display or defined 
diffusely by a sample of data. The experimenter randomly selected one 
of two populations and then sampled data from the selected population. 
The subjects made very nearly Bayesian revisions on the basis of the first 
datum sampled, but became markedly conservative when the task required 
aggregating evidence across a sequence of data. This result was independent 
of whether population proportions were defined precisely or diffusely. 
M a n  comes to know his world largely by  inference. He  observes only 
a portion of his environment,  and draws general conclusions on the 
basis of such observations. This generalization from limited observations 
is analogous to statistical inference, the process by which a statist ician 
uses samples of data  as a basis for making inferences about  parent  
populations. In  order to investigate the process by  which man makes  
inferences from samples to populations, several experiments have used 
the following paradigm: A set of al ternat ive hypotheses specify dif- 
ferent populations and the subject is shown data  sampled from one of 
them. Upon observing each datum, the subject becomes more or less 
sure of which hypothesis is correct and reflects this change of opinion 
by  revising probabili t ies he has assigned to the hypotheses. Such a 
revision of probabilit ies is interpreted as intuitive statistical inference, 
The experiments have usually shown tha t  the intuitive inferences are 
conservative;  subjects revise the probabi l i ty  estimates less than the 
opt imal  amount  as prescribed by  formal Bayesian models of statistical 
inference (e.g., Edwards,  Lindman, and Phillips, 1965). 
1The research reported here was conducted in the Engineering Psychology 
Laboratory, Institute of Science and Technology, The University of Michigan. The 
research was supported by USPHS Fellowship MF 12.012-02, and by the Air Force 
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1 
© 1968 by Academic Press Inc. 
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These previous experiments investigated probability revision wher~ 
the hypotheses were specific, i.e., each hypothesis specified a particular 
value for the population parameter. In nonlaboratory situations, how- 
ever, hypotheses are formed not only by explicit definition, but often by 
the less exact knowledge provided by data previously sampled from the 
hypothesized populations. A hypothesis about a population known only 
indirectly through observing a sample of data is not specific; it is diffuse 
because a sample of data provides a somewhat vague estimate of the 
population parameter. 
The experiments reported below investigated intuitive inferences made 
about diffuse as well as about specific hypotheses. 
EXPERIMENT I 
In order to contrast the effects of specific and diffuse hypotheses 
upon intuitive inferences, a single datum was sampled from one of two 
possible binomial populations; subjects used that datum as a basis for 
making an inference about the population from which the datum was 
sampled. The binomial probability of the datum was P for one popu- 
lation and 1--P for the other. The value of P was defined explicitly for 
specific hypotheses but only vaguely, by a sample of data from the 
population, for diffuse hypotheses. 
The quality of performance on the inference task was measured by 
comparing each subject's inference with the corresponding optimal 
inference. Bayes's theorem specifies the optimal inference as follows: 
P(H~]D) P(DIH,) P(H~) 
= (1) P(HblD) P(DIHb) P(Hb) 
where P(Hi) is the probability of hypothesis Hi prior to the observation 
of a datum, P(DIHi) is the probability of sampling datum D if Hi is 
true, and P(HilD) is the revised probability of Hi based upon the 
information provided by D. Equation 1 specifies that the odds of Ha to 
Hb should be revised from the right-hand ratio, the prior odds, to the 
left-hand ratio, the posterior odds, as a result of sampling datum D. The 
optimal amount of revision depends upon the middle ratio, the likeli- 
hood ratio. Since prior odds and estimated posterior odds are obtained 
from each subject for each inference, the amount of his probability 
revision is calculated by inferring what likelihood ratio would have led 
to that revision from prior to posterior odds. The logarithm of the likeli- 
hood ratio (LLR) is the appropriate measure of revision (see Peterson, 
Schneider, and Miller, 1965). A comparison of the theoretical LLR with 
ghe inferred LLR of subjects provides a measure of performance on the 
inference task. 
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Method 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
For specific hypotheses, the experimenter directly displayed the com- 
positions of each binomial population; he displayed the value of each 
P(DIH). The process of establishing P(DIH) for each diffuse hypothesis 
was somewhat more complex. Instructions first specified that a popu- 
lation proportion had been selected by random procedure prior to the 
experiment such that all proportions between 0 and 1 were equally 
likely. A random sample, hereafter called the defining sample, of binary 
events from the selected population further defined the diffuse hypoth- 
esis. Under these conditions, if a defining sample of size n contains r 
examples of datum D, the probability that the next datum drawn will 
also be D is equal to (r ~ -1 ) / ( n  ~ 2), which is the expected value of 
the population proportion (see the appendix for a derivation of this 
conclusion). This expected value serves as P(D]H) for each diffuse 
hypothesis. 
The contrast in the sources of P(DIHi) for the specific and diffuse 
hypotheses illustrates an important characteristic of diffuseness. For 
specific hypotheses P(D[Hi) is defined explicitly. The population 
proportion is known precisely. In the diffuse case, however, P(DIHi) is 
an expected value. It  is the expected value of the probability distribution 
over all possible population proportions; the true parameter cannot be 
known precisely because the knowledge derives from sampling only a 
portion of the entire population. 
When a sample of data diffusely defines the population parameter the 
definition can be based on various sized samples. Therefore, the number 
of data used in defining diffuse hypotheses was varied from 1 to 19 as 
an independent variable. Furthermore, previous research has shown that 
the quality of intuitive inference varies with diagnostic value of data 
(Peterson and Miller, 1965). Accordingly, for both specific and diffuse 
hypotheses, the experiment used four levels of diagnosticity equivalent 
to the symmetrical binomial proportions of .60-.40, .67-.33, .75-.25, and 
.90-.10. 
Subjects, Fifteen paid University of Michigan men students served as 
subjects in groups of either 3, 4, or 5 each. 
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE 
As the  physical data generating model associated with each hypothesis, 
subjects were instructed to imagine sampling at random with replacement 
from a large urn filled with red and blue poker chips. The procedure 
contained three stages; the first required inferences about specific hy- 
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potheses, the second about diffuse hypotheses, and the third about specific 
hypotheses again. For each inference task the experimenter selected one 
of two imaginary urns, either the predominantly red urn or the predom- 
inantly blue urn, by the toss of a fair coin. One chip was then sampled 
at random from the selected urn (the experimenter explained that all 
sampling had been done prior to the experiment and simply read the 
sample from a list). On the basis of the sample, the experimenter 
instructed the subjects to estimate from which urn it was more likely 
that the chip had been sampled and how many times more likely. Thus, 
the estimates were in the form of posterior odds. The subjects were to 
base inferences on their knowledge about the situation: the relative 
composition of the two urns, the fact that one of the two was chosen by 
a random procedure, and the information provided by the datum 
sampled from the chosen urn. Each subject then recorded his estimated 
odds on an answer sheet and the experimenter progressed to the next 
inference task. 
For specific hypotheses, a disk display represented the composition of 
each urn, i.e., the relative proportions of red and blue chips. In the 60- 
40 case, for example, the display indicated 60% red chips in one urn 
and 40% red chips in the other. For the diffuse hypotheses, the experi- 
menter instructed the subjects to imagine a very large urn containing 
thousands of red and blue chips. The proportion of red chips in the urn 
was selected by a random procedure prior to the experiment, such that 
all percentages were equally likely. Then the experimenter provided the 
subjects with information about the population proportion by reading off 
and displaying an imaginary sequence of chips drawn from the urn. 
The subjects needed only to observe the display in order to understand 
the instructions about specific hypotheses. Their comprehension of the 
instructions about diffuse hypotheses was evaluated by requiring each 
subject to make a point estimate of the value of the population pro- 
portion after observing each chip in the defining sample. Each subject 
made his point estimate by sliding a marker, along a scale indexed from 
0% red to 100% red, to the point that divided the possible percentages 
of red into two intervals. He was to select the point that made it equally 
likely that the true percentage of red was contained in either interval. * 
The subiect began by setting his marker at 50%. Upon observing each 
The point that partitions a probability distribution into two equal areas is the 
median of that distribution. An earlier experiment (Peterson and Miller, 1964) and 
a pilot test of the present procedure both indicated that it is more appropriate 
for subjects to estimate medians than means. Medians are close to the means used 
in this experiment and so were used for the point estimates for reasons of experi- 
mental convenience. 
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sampled chip, he repartitioned the scale into two equally likely intervals 
based upon the cumulative impact of the data in the defining sample. 
The crucial inference task with diffuse hypotheses came at the end 
of each defining sample. The experimenter instructed the subjects that 
there was a second urn which contained the reverse composition of the 
first urn (from which the defining sample was drawn). The experimenter 
selected either the first or second urn by the toss of a coin and then 
drew a single chip out of the selected urn. On the basis of the chip 
drawn, the subject indicated whether it was more likely that the chip 
was sampled from the first or the second urn and how many times more 
likely. This procedure continued through all of the diffuse hypothesis 
conditions. 
The third stage of the experimental procedure then replicated the first 
stage, again using specific hypotheses, in an effort to increase the 
stability of the measures. 
Results 
All inferences were evaluated by comparing absolute values of inferred 
log likelihood ratios with corresponding theoretical values. The log likeli- 
hood ratio is in the form of log P / ( 1 - - P ) .  In an effort to achieve 
comparability of results this transformation was used for all data 
analyses throughout the experiment. 
COMPREHENSION OF DIFFUSE I-IYPOTHESES 
Recall that inferences with diffuse hypotheses required the subjects 
to use two classes of samples. First, populations were defined diffusely 
by means of what we have called defining samples, and then an in]or- 
mational sample of a single datum provided information about which 
population had been selected. The left graph in Fig. 1 refers to inferences 
based on the first kind of sample. It  indicates how accurately the subjects 
comprehended data that defined, diffusely, each population. All data 
points were taken from the final estimate of each defining sample. The 
abscissa indicates the n of the defining sample and the ordinate refers 
to the absolute value of the log P / ( 1 - - P )  transformation of the point 
estimate of the proportion of red chips in the urn. This transformation 
increases from zero as the median of the probability distribution over P 
departs from 0.5. Solid lines connect data points and the nearly hori- 
zontal dashed lines show corresponding theoretical values. 
The subjects generally comprehended the implications of defining 
samples very well. There is a close parallel between theoretical and data 
values. The major exception to this principle resides in the two smallest 
defining samples, with n's of i and 2, respectively. Here the response 
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Fro. 1. Inferred log likelihood rat io as a function of the n of the defining 
sample for diffuse hypotheses. For  specific (displayed) hypotheses, probabi l i ty  
revisions were made either before ( ls t )  or after  (2rid) the diffuse hypothesis task. 
The  four different symbols refer to the four different levels of diagnostic value. 
Dashed lines refer to  theoretical  values. Vertical lines show plus and minus one 
s tandard error of each mean.  
functions fall sharply below corresponding theoretical :values. The 
subjects responded as if a defining sample of only 1 chip or 2 chips 
contained very little information about the population proportion. 
INFERENCES WITH DIFFUSE AND SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES 
The middle panel in Fig. 1 refers to inferences between two diffuse 
hypotheses, inferences based on informational samples. Most were nearly 
optimal. Inferences were substantially conservative in only two instances, 
again with defining samples of 1 and 2. Comparison of both graphs sug- 
gests that the conservatism in these two instances can be accounted for 
by a suboptimal comprehension of the diffuse hypotheses, i.e., by earlier 
conservatism in interpreting the implications of the defining sample (this 
correspondence is analogous to the consistency in the revision of prob- 
ability estimates reported by Beach, 1966; by Peterson, Ulehla, Miller, 
Bourne, and Stilson, 1965; and by Peterson, DuCharme, and Edwards, 
in press). 
The near optimality in making inferences about most diffuse hypoth- 
eses was also evident when subjects made inferences about specific 
hypotheses, hypotheses for which the experimenter displayed the precise 
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composition of the population. The results of inferences about these 
specific hypotheses are displayed on the right hand side of the right 
graph in Fig. 1. The inferences labeled 1st were those made prior to the 
diffuse hypothesis portion of the experiment and those labeled 2nd were 
made after the diffuse hypothesis portion. The second set of inferences 
appears slightly more conservative than the first, but the overriding 
result is that inferences with specific hypotheses were nearly optimal, 
iust as were inferences about diffuse hypotheses. 
Discussion 
The subjects evidenced a high level of performance on inference tasks 
throughout the experiment. They made nearly optimal inferences about 
specific hypotheses; they correctly comprehended the defining samples 
for most diffuse hypotheses; and they made nearly optimal inferences 
about those diffuse hypotheses. The only exception to this high level of 
performance was in the case in which the defining samples contained 
only one or two data. In those cases, conservative inferences can be 
explained by corresponding conservative interpretations of the defining 
samples. Why those interpretations were conservative remains un- 
explained; perhaps people are unwilling to believe that only one or two 
data provide much information for the definition of populations. 
Why did this experiment fail to yield the conservatism found in the 
previous experiments on intuitive inference? Experiment I I  was con- 
ducted for the purpose of answering that question. 
EXPERIMENT II 
The results of several experiments indicate that part of conservative 
human inference is due to a difficulty in the aggregation of evidence 
across a sequence of data (e.g., Edwards, 1966; Phillips, 1966; Schum, 
1966). This may explain why Exp. I found so little of the conservatism 
prevalent in previous experiments. Each of the informational samples 
in Exp. I contained only a single datum whereas informational samples 
in many earlier experiments contained sequences of up to 48 dat~ 
(Edwards et al., 1965; Peterson et al., 1965; Phillips and Edwards, 
1966). Accordingly, Exp. II  replicated most of Exp. I except that all 
informational samples were extended to contain sequences of data and 
subjects revised their estimates about the identity of the selected popu- 
lation after each datum in the sequence. 
Method 
The apparatus and the procedure of Exp. II  were essentially the same 
as those of Exp. I except for the deletion of several defining samples of 
intermediate size. The essential change in Exp. II  was that each 
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informational sample now contained a sequence of five data; subjects 
revised their odds estimates about the population from which the data 
were being sampled after the presentation of each datum in the sequence. 
Subjects. Eighteen men students of the University of Michigan served 
as paid subjects in groups of 3, 4, or 5 each. 
Results 
The left graph in Fig. 2 displays log likelihood ratios from inferences 
based on the first datum in each sequence. Inferences about specific 
hypotheses are slightly more conservative than those in Exp. I; all data 
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Fro. 2. Inferred log likelihood ratio as a function of n of the defining sample 
for diffuse hypotheses. For specific (displayed) hypotheses, probability revisions 
were made either before (Ist) or after (2nd) the diffuse hypothesis task. The four 
different symbols refer to the four different levels of diagnostic value. Dashed Unes 
refer to theoretical values. Vertical lines show plus and minus one standard error 
of each mean. 
however, is overshadowed by the relatively small distance separating 
data points from corresponding theoretical lines. Inferences about diffuse 
hypotheses based on the first datum replicated the results of Exp. I; 
inferences were nearly optimal except with defining samples of only 
1 or 2 data. 
The right hand graph of Fig. 2 is based upon the mean across Trials 
2-5 of absolute inferred log likelihood ratio for each trial. Here is the 
kind of conservatism that has pervaded previous experiments. In the 
case of specific hypotheses, the average amount of inference was generally 
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less than that called for theoretically, and the degree of conservatism 
was much greater for high theoretical log likelihood ratios. As in previous 
experiments, intuitive inferences failed to discriminate adequately among 
the experimental conditions; the data points frequently overlap each 
other. 
Results are a little less clear in the case of diffuse hypotheses. I t  is the 
nature of these diffuse hypotheses that the theoretical values of log 
likelihood ratios do not remain constant across trials of an informational 
sample (calculations of these theoretical values are based on equations 
presented in the appendix). The mean absolute value of the theoretical 
ratios across Trials 2-5 are indicated by points connected by dashed 
lines. These values are, for the most part, less than the corresponding 
theoretical values for specific hypotheses. Results show that the average 
amount of inference for diffuse hypotheses was more conservative for 
Trials 2-5 than for Trial 1. However, subjects seemed to discriminate 
among the experimental conditions better with diffuse hypotheses than 
with specific hypotheses. Even though theoretical values became less 
separated during Trials 2-5, the relative amounts of revision remained 
separated. 
Discussion 
Experiments I and II  yield three clear conclusions. First, subjects make 
excellent inferences from data when their task is to learn about the 
composition of populations by observing sampled data. They reflect 
nearly optimal understanding of defining samples except when the sample 
size is very small. The reason for this exception remains unexplained. 
Second, intuitive inferences about diffuse hypotheses are just as 
nearly optimal, and sometimes more so, than intuitive inferences about 
specific hypotheses. The fact that the former are considerably more 
difficult to deal with conceptually failed to deteriorate the performance 
of subjects in these experiments. Perhaps diffuse hypotheses are more 
compatible with human inference because they are more representative 
of nonlaboratory inference tasks. 
Third, these experiments support the conclusion of some earlier experi- 
men t s - t ha t  at least one locus of conservative inference resides in the 
task of aggregating evidence across sequential samples. Intuitive in- 
ferences were nearly optimal when based upon only a single datum or 
upon the first datum in a sequence. Subsequent data in sequences, how- 
ever, elicited suboptimal, conservative inferences. The mounting 
evidence that the task of aggregating evidence leads to conservative 
inferences calls for more research aimed at an explanation of the 
phenomenon. 
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APPENDIX 
A diffuse hypothesis in the present context means that the value of 
the binomial population proportion, p, is not known precisely. Instead, 
the probability that each of the possible values of p, from 0 to 1.0, is 
the true population proportion is given by a beta density function. The 
beta distribution is the natural conjugate to the binomial distribution, 
which means that if one's opinions about p are described by a beta 
distribution and a random sample is taken from the binomial population 
then the Bayesian posterior opinion about p will be described by a beta 
distribution with new parameters. 
In this experiment subiects were told initially that the value of p 
was selected randomly such that all values from 0 to 1.0 were equally 
likely. This procedure defines a rectangular probability distribution over 
p which can be described by a beta density function (Raiffa and 
Schlaifer, 1961, p. 263, Eq. 9-9) having parameters: r" ---- 1 and n' = 2. 
Applying the results of Raiffa and Schlaifer (p. 263, Eq. 9-10), if a 
defining sample in the present experiment contained r red chips and n-r 
blue chips the posterior beta distribution over p would be 
P ( p l r , n ; r '  = 1, n '  = 2) = r ! ( n  - r)!p,(1 _ p),-r 
n! 
(1) 
The probability of drawing re red chips in n~ draws from a diffuse hy- 
pothesis defined by Eq. 1 is shown by Raiffa and Schlaifer (P. 265, Eq. 
9-18 and P. 237, Eq. 7-76) to be 
P ( r s l r , n ; r '  = 1 , n '  = 2;ns)  = (rs ~-  r ) ! (n~  -{- n - rs - r ) ! n , ! ( n  + 1) 1 
r , ! r ! ( n ,  - r , ) ! ( n  - r ) ! (n~ + n + 1)[ 
(2)  
The probability of drawing a single red chip is found by setting re = n, 
= 1 and is equal to (r ~ 1) / (n  ~ 2). 
In the odds revision portion of the experiment, Urn 2 was known to 
have the reverse composition of Urn 1. This means that the beta param- 
eters for the diffuse hypothesis over p for Urn 2 are the reverse of those 
which described Urn 1 (i.e., n 2 - ~  n l ,  r~, = n l - - r l ) .  This likelihood 
ratio in favor of Urn 1 over Urn 2, based upon a sample of re red chips 
in n8 draws, is therefore; 
L(r~,n~IH1 :H.~) = 
P ( r , ! r , n ; r  t -- 1,n' = 2;n~) 
P ( r ~ I n  - r , n ; r '  =, 1,n' = 2;n~) 
(r~ + r ) ! ( m  + n - ro - r ) !  
(r~ -~- n -- r)!(n~ -- r~ -~ r) l 
--  (3)  
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For  a revision sample consisting of a single chip, n,-----1 and Eq. 3 
simplifies to (r -~ 1 ) / ( n - - r  + 1) or (n--r  + 1 ) / ( r  + 1), depending upon 
whether  a red (r~ = 1) or blue (r, ~- 0) chip is sampled. 
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